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Abstract 
The problem in PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co 
Ltd 2014 UKPC 35 (10 November 2014), 2014 1 WLR 4482 (PC) 
was that the Cayman liquidators, frustrated by the unhelpfulness 
of the company's previous auditors in supplying documents and 
information to help the liquidators get to the bottom of the 
company's problems, then obtained a winding-up order in 
Bermuda, the auditors' home jurisdiction, to have them 
examined. The auditors appealed successfully to the Privy 
Council in London to have the winding-up stayed. The facts and 
the reasoning of this senior court are described, and then 
critically discussed in this case comment. The auditors were 
erroneously added to the statutory list of persons who may apply 
to the court for the stay of the winding-up proceedings. Still, the 
decision may be supported for the finding that, on the particular 
facts of the case, the auditors had standing to challenge the 
winding-up application because the Bermudian court of first 
instance had no jurisdiction under the relevant statutes and the 
auditors were the direct targets of the application to wind up the 
company and examine them. The outcome of the decision carries 
important implications for the development of company law in 
England and Bermuda, and for the corresponding company law 
in South Africa, where the decision is of persuasive authority. 
Keywords 
Cross-border insolvency; companies; list of persons who may 
seek a stay of a winding-up order; grounds for challenging a 
winding-up order. 
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1 Introduction 
It is possible that company outsiders who hold documents with important 
information may refuse to hand these over to the company's liquidators. 
Complications may arise in the case of international companies: the 
outsiders may be domiciled in another country and not be subject to the 
court orders or legislation of the country where the winding-up order was 
issued, a problem increasingly foreseeable – including in South Africa – with 
globalisation and companies seeking new markets. To solve this problem in 
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Company Limited (hereafter 
the PwC case),1 the liquidators applied to wind up the company in a foreign 
country but ultimately failed. The decision of the Board of the Privy Council, 
although flawed in adding the auditors to the relevant statutory list of 
persons who may seek a stay of the winding-up order, is still to be supported 
for the finding that on the facts the auditors had the required standing to 
challenge the winding-up order, an outcome important for the development 
of company law in England and Bermuda, and of persuasive authority in 
South Africa. 
In this case comment, the facts and issues are briefly stated, and the 
reasoning of the Board deciding the appeal from Bermuda is then 
summarised. Critical comments on the reasoning follow, and suggestions 
for dealing with the corresponding problem: the foreign liquidator applies to 
a South African court for a winding-up order under the legislation on 
companies and in the context of the law of civil procedure. A conclusion with 
relevant findings rounds off this case comment. 
2 Facts 
The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands wound up Saad Investments 
Company Limited (SICL), which was registered in that jurisdiction. The 
court-appointed liquidators found that the affairs of SICL should be 
investigated in several countries. 
The liquidators sought information and documents about SICL from the 
Bermudian branch of SICL’s former auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC). Sluggishly complying with a Cayman court order to deliver their 
                                            
* Alastair D Smith. BA LLB (Rhodes) PhD (Edin). Professor, Department of Mercantile 
Law, School of Law, University of South Africa. Email: smithad@unisa.ac.za. 
1  2014 UKPC 35 (10 November 2014), 2014 1 WLR 4482 (PC) (hereafter the PwC 
case). 
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working files,2 PwC delivered several documents showing heavy and 
unjustified redaction.3 
So the Cayman liquidators applied to the Supreme Court of Bermuda for the 
winding up of SICL. The liquidators intended to rely on section 195 of the 
Bermudian Companies Act 1981, authorising the court to summon and 
examine on oath persons, such as PwC in this case, who the court 
considers can give information about the company's conduct, affairs or 
property, and requiring these persons to hand over books or papers that 
they have about the company.4  
Winding up SICL, Kawaley CJ appointed the Cayman liquidators as 
provisional liquidators in Bermuda and summoned PwC to appear for 
examination and produce all their documents about SICL's affairs.5 PwC 
challenged this order in the Bermudian Court of Appeal, arguing that the 
chief justice lacked jurisdiction to make the winding-up order or to appoint 
the Cayman liquidators as Bermudian liquidators. These arguments did not 
convince the appeal court, and so PwC appealed to the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council.6 The discussion turns to the status of the Privy Council 
and the two issues for its decision in the PwC case. 
3 The two issues in the Privy Council 
The decision in the PwC case was unanimous, delivered by the highest 
judges of the United Kingdom on cross-border insolvency matters. The 
Judicial Committee also remains the apex court of appeal for, among other 
courts, those of  
… many current and former Commonwealth countries, as well as the United 
Kingdom's overseas territories, crown dependencies, and military sovereign 
base areas.7  
The PwC appeal came before Lord Neuberger PSC, Lords Mance, Clarke 
and Sumption JJSC, and Lord Collins. Lord Neuberger gave judgment on 
two issues. The first was whether the court had jurisdiction to liquidate SICL, 
                                            
2  PwC case para 5. 
3  PwC case para 6. 
4  Sections 195(1)-(3) of the Companies Act 1981. 
5  PwC case para 10. 
6  On the structure of the court system and the right of appeal in Bermuda, see Bell 2012 
http://tinyurl.com/hlfskxe para I. 
7  Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 2015 http://tinyurl.com/hg3c2u3. For a map, 
see Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 2015 http://tinyurl.com/gvcfnwz. 
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and the second was whether PwC might challenge the order granted under 
section 195 of the Companies Act 1981 (hereafter the section 195 order).8 
4 The judgment of the Board 
The two issues before the Board are dealt with in turn. 
4.1 The first issue: jurisdiction to wind up SICL 
PwC argued that the Bermudian Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to 
liquidate SICL under the Companies Act 1981.9 SICL did not carry on 
business in Bermuda. PwC should not have been summoned under section 
195 of that statute. The respondents, the liquidators, replied that the court 
had jurisdiction under the Companies Act 1981 or the External Companies 
(Jurisdiction in Actions) Act 1885. And even if the court lacked this 
jurisdiction, PwC could not attack the winding-up order, particularly by 
defending the liquidators' application for a section 195 order. 
The Board held that the Bermudian Supreme Court had only statutory 
jurisdiction to wind up companies.10 Part XIII of the 1981 Act controlled the 
case. Section 161 of that statute stated how the court might wind up a 
company.11 Definitions in section 2 of the statute were important and applied 
all the way through the statute unless the context required otherwise. A 
company was "a company to which this Act applies by virtue of section 4(1)" 
of the statute.12 And an "overseas company" was  
… any body corporate incorporated outside Bermuda other than a non-
resident insurance undertaking.13 
For present purposes, for companies not registered or incorporated in 
Bermuda, section 4(1) applied the 1981 Act to "any overseas companies so 
far as any provision of this Act requires it to apply".14 
The Board rejected the liquidators' argument that Part XIII conferred 
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Bermuda to liquidate SICL.15 It was an 
overseas company. Section 161 clearly provided for jurisdiction regarding 
"companies" only. That wording did not govern overseas companies if the 
                                            
8  PwC case paras 13, 23. 
9  PwC case para 11. 
10  Part XIII of the Companies Act 1981. 
11  Section 161(g) of the Companies Act 1981. 
12  Section 2 of the Companies Act 1981. 
13  Section 2 of the Companies Act 1981. 
14  Sections 4(1)(a)-(d) of the Companies Act 1981. 
15  PwC case para 16. 
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context did not require otherwise. Part XIII did not indicate an intention that 
it should govern overseas companies. This interpretation by the Board was 
consistent with other provisions of the Companies Act 1981.16 It was clear 
that the Supreme Court of Bermuda lacked jurisdiction to liquidate SICL 
under the Companies Act 1981. 
The Board considered the liquidators' alternative argument, regarding 
jurisdiction under the External Companies (Jurisdiction in Actions) Act 
1885.17 Two subsections of this statute were important; they applied to 
companies incorporated outside Bermuda that did business there by agents 
or branches. These companies might be sued in the Bermudian Supreme 
Court on a cause of action that arose wholly or partly in Bermuda.18 In 
addition, these suits might be continued all the way to judgment as though 
the company were incorporated in Bermuda or had its principal place of 
business there.19 
PwC put forward two arguments why this 1885 Act did not apply. Firstly, 
SICL did not do business in Bermuda by agents or branches, and SICL had 
obtained a Bermudian company's shares through a Bermudian bank. The 
Board held that this series of steps was not sufficient for carrying on 
business in Bermuda.20 
Secondly, held the Board,21 presenting a winding-up petition did not usually 
amount to suing SICL for a cause of action.22 Where the petition and 
Bermuda were linked only by the petitioner's aim to enforce a right under a 
Bermudian insolvency statute, a right that would arise only after the winding-
up order had been granted,23 the Board held that even if there were a cause 
of action, it was difficult to see how one could say that such a cause of action 
could arise in Bermuda. By PwC's making the argument that such a cause 
of action did arise in Bermuda, PwC were "pulling themselves up by their 
own bootstraps".24 Accordingly, the Bermudian court had no statutory 
jurisdiction to appoint the SICL liquidators, nor could the court wind up SICL. 
                                            
16  Section 4(1A)(b) of the Companies Act 1981 Act read with s 134; see the PwC case 
paras 17-18. 
17  See the 1989 revision of the External Companies (Jurisdiction in Actions) Act 1885 
(as amended). 
18  Section 1(1) of the External Companies (Jurisdiction in Actions) Act 1885. 
19  Section 1(3) of the External Companies (Jurisdiction in Actions) Act 1885. 
20  PwC case para 21. 
21  PwC case para 22. 
22  Section 1(3) of the External Companies (Jurisdiction in Actions) Act 1885. 
23  PwC case para 22. 
24  PwC case para 22. 
AD SMITH  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  6 
Did it then follow, as the second issue, that PwC could escape the section 
195 order? If so, why? 
4.2 The second issue: the right to challenge the section 195 order 
The liquidators mounted an argument in three steps. These steps 
concerned why this winding-up order was effective unless it was set aside. 
In addition, the argument dealt with why PwC could not attack the winding-
up order and the section 195 order. 
4.2.1 The first step in the liquidators' argument 
The Board approved of the first step in the liquidators' argument.25 The 
Bermudian Supreme Court order was granted by a court of unrestricted 
jurisdiction. On basic principles, its order was effective. It thus had to be 
regarded as effective unless set aside by the court.26 The liquidation order 
could not be examined unless set aside or stayed.27 
4.2.2 The second, complex step in the argument 
The liquidators also raised a second, complex argument. As jurisdiction was 
lacking, PwC could have applied to the Supreme Court of Bermuda to have 
the winding-up order set aside or stayed; or PwC could have applied to the 
Court of Appeal to have the order discharged; or, even if the winding-up 
continued, PwC could still have had the section 195 order set aside.28 
The Board confirmed that PwC could have taken the point regarding 
jurisdiction in the Bermudian Supreme Court. The present facts were 
"unusual".29 The Board exercised the power to set aside the winding-up 
order as the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of Bermuda ought to 
have done. 
The Board quoted section 184(1) of the Companies Act 1981. Its provisions, 
which are important for the present discussion, read as follows:30  
                                            
25  PwC case para 25. 
26  Isaacs v Robertson 1985 1 AC 97 (PC) 101F per Lord Diplock (hereafter the Isaacs 
case). 
27  In re Dover & Deal Railway Co 1854 4 De GM & G 411  420; 43 ER 567 571 per Knight 
Bruce LJ; In re London Marine Insurance Association 1869 LR 8 Eq 176 193 per 
James V-C. 
28  PwC case para 26. 
29  PwC case para 27. 
30  PwC case para 28. 
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The [Supreme] Court may at any time after an order for winding up, on the 
application either of the liquidator or the official receiver or any creditor or 
contributory and on proof to the satisfaction of the court that all proceedings in 
relation to the winding up ought to be stayed, make an order staying the 
proceedings, either altogether or for a limited time, on such terms and 
conditions as the court thinks fit. 
Further, section 184(2) enables the Bermudian court to  
… make such order as it considers desirable to enable the company to be as 
near as practicable as it was before the winding up order was made.31 
The Board devoted most of the rest of its judgment to dealing with the 
liquidators' further five arguments about why PwC could not request Her 
Majesty to stay the Bermudian winding-up proceedings.32 These five 
arguments are dealt with in turn, under subheadings to make them more 
accessible for readers. 
4.2.2.1  PwC were outsiders with limited room to manoeuvre  
The first argument concerned the status of PwC as outsiders to the winding-
up. In principle, such outsiders could not even raise the issue that the 
Supreme Court should stay the winding-up. Or, if PwC could raise this 
argument, they could do so only as friends of the court, and would then not 
have the right of appeal. So PwC could not raise this argument at this stage 
of the matter.33 
On this point, held the Board, PwC were not one of the persons mentioned 
in section 184(1) of the 1981 Act. There was also considerable authority that 
outsiders could not make arguments when winding-up was sought. 
Outsiders had no standing for a late challenge to the issue or the continuing 
of the winding-up order.34 The Board held that outsiders would not normally 
be heard on whether the winding-up order ought to have been granted.35 
Yet this useful general rule was flexible. The PwC case had two significant 
and rare facts: the winding-up order had been challenged only as regards 
jurisdiction; and the outsiders were only technically outsiders to the winding-
up. In general, a party subjected to a section 195 order could not query the 
issuing of the winding-up order at the end of the application. To make this 
                                            
31  PwC case para 28. 
32  PwC case para 29. 
33  PwC case paras 29, 30. 
34  PwC case para 30, giving the example of In re Mid East Trading Ltd 1998 BCC 726 
(CA) (hereafter the Mid East case) 731G-733H and Evans-Lombe J's citations in the 
High Court. 
35  PwC case para 31. 
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challenge, the party subject to a section 195 order required support by one 
of the parties mentioned in section 184(1) of the 1981 Act. By contrast, 
though, if the lack of jurisdiction could well be questioned on the court 
papers, this point needed to be dealt with properly. And if this lack of 
jurisdiction were proved, then the interests of justice would need to be 
considered,36 an outcome that had been suggested by Chadwick LJ in a 
previous decision.37 
PwC were not mere outsiders but were the only immediate targets of the 
intended winding-up and the section 195 order. Consequently, PwC had 
standing for their challenge regarding jurisdiction for the winding-up when 
they challenged the section 195 order.38 In the PwC case, the liquidators 
had relied on the just and equitable ground for the winding up of SICL so as 
to seek a section 195 order. When they attacked the section 195 order, PwC 
had standing sufficient to query the existence of jurisdiction by the court to 
make the winding-up order.39 An outsider to the winding-up might 
appropriately make representations when the winding-up petition was 
heard,40 yet PwC were not in court at that stage, and received no special 
notice of the petition, except as members of the public who had seen the 
advertisement of the winding-up proceedings. And PwC had challenged 
those proceedings once "they reasonably could have done so".41 
The Board then mentioned that the winding-up could be stayed by the court 
if the stay were applied for by some itemised people, such as the liquidator. 
Auditors such as PwC were not listed. PwC were absent from the court at 
that point, but the liquidators were present, as the Bermudian Supreme 
Court's appointees and officers of that court. On the wording of section 
184(1) the Bermudian Supreme Court ought to have been satisfied that 
clearly there was no jurisdiction to grant the winding-up order. Then, if a stay 
or setting aside were considered possible, the court "could and should have 
effectively required" the liquidators to seek the stay of the winding-up.42 The 
court should have allowed the liquidators to be heard, and then "could and 
should simply" have stayed the winding-up. 
                                            
36  PwC case para 32. 
37  Mid East case 747A-B. 
38  PwC case para 33. 
39  PwC case para 33. 
40  In re Bradford Navigation Company 1870 LR 5 Ch App 600 603 per James LJ 
(hereafter the Bradford case). 
41  PwC case para 33. 
42  PwC case para 34. 
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The liquidators continued: even if PwC had the right to query the lack of 
jurisdiction, PwC had no standing to appeal against the Supreme Court's 
refusal to set aside the winding-up order, because PwC were outsiders to 
the liquidation proceedings. PwC could query jurisdiction only as friends of 
the court and thus not on appeal. That ruling had been made in In re 
Bradford Navigation Company (hereafter the Bradford case).  
The Board distinguished the circumstances of the Bradford case from those 
of the PwC case.43 In the Bradford case the applicant was not affected by 
the winding-up order, nor did the applicant challenge the jurisdiction to grant 
the order as PwC were doing. And James LJ in the Bradford case had 
refused the application "in very general terms". These were not relevant to 
the present circumstances, said Lord Neuberger in the PwC case. James 
LJ had held that it would be  
… extending litigation beyond all possible limits if every person who may have 
a right with respect to property which belongs to the company could come 
here and say that the winding up will interfere with his rights.44 
In the PwC case the Board was cautious in hearing representations from a 
party other than the parties mentioned in section 184(1) of the 1981 Act as 
a person who opposed the granting of the liquidation order. Yet the Board 
could 
… see no reason why, in appropriate circumstances, a person who will be 
directly affected by a winding up order should not have the right to be added 
as a party to the proceedings.45 
The Board emphasised that this step would rarely take place. 
"Exceptionality", held the Board, "is not a very useful guide".46 Usually, the 
mere fact that interests would be affected by the winding-up would not 
warrant hearing a party. In the PwC case, by contrast, jurisdiction had been 
challenged, and the liquidators had brought the winding-up petition only to 
obtain relief against PwC.47 Interfering with PwC's rights would be a breach 
of natural justice if PwC were not allowed, formally as parties and not merely 
informally as friends of the court, to challenge the granting of the order. 
These facts were exceptional, and PwC were entitled to be added as 
parties.  
                                            
43  PwC case para 35. 
44  Bradford case 603; PwC case para 35. 
45  PwC case para 36. 
46  PwC case para 36. 
47  PwC case para 37. 
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With the benefit of hindsight, in these unusual circumstances PwC ought to 
have been notified and allowed to make representations regarding the court 
order.48 If PwC were entitled to be added as parties, they had not been 
notified. So, unless there were good reasons to the contrary, PwC should 
have had the right to query jurisdiction before the Supreme Court of 
Bermuda and also further on appeal. PwC would have had the right to 
challenge the issue of the order had they been parties to the petition.49 
4.2.2.2 The winding-up order was unchallengeable during the winding-up 
The second argument made by the liquidators was as follows. The winding-
up order could not be challenged during the liquidation proceedings 
themselves.50 The Board considered this argument flawed.51 At best, the 
invalidity of the proceedings could be challenged only if the proceedings 
themselves were set aside.52 As long as the winding-up order continued, 
the section 195 order could not be challenged on the ground that the basic 
winding-up order had been issued without jurisdiction. Such a ruling 
followed from the principle in Isaacs v Robertson53 and the fact that 
otherwise the winding-up order would then be applied inconsistently.  
However, the Board held that this was not what PwC were arguing.54 A stay 
meant that the winding-up order would have no effect in general. The 
liquidators' counsel had also argued incorrectly that the associated 
challenge to the winding-up order should be prohibited. PwC were arguing 
not only that the winding-up should not have been granted,55 but also that 
the court should stay the winding-up generally under section 184(1). 
The liquidators raised an argument on a principle of procedure. During the 
winding-up proceedings it could not be argued that the winding-up order had 
been made without jurisdiction.56 The Board rejected this reasoning by the 
liquidators. Such a principle, it was held, would be unwarranted and unjust. 
Chadwick LJ's judgment in a previous case had been relied on to support 
the liquidators' reasoning. The Board overruled it as support for this 
                                            
48  PwC case para 38. 
49  PwC case para 39. 
50  PwC case paras 29, 40. 
51  PwC case para 40. 
52  Mid East case 746F-H. 
53  Isaacs case 101F. 
54  PwC case para 41. 
55  To use Jessel MR's words (In re Arthur Average Association 1875 LR 10 Ch App 542 
545). 
56  PwC case para 42. 
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contention. In any event, it was held, Chadwick LJ's judgment would not 
apply to the PwC case.57 
4.2.2.3 PwC had not sought a stay in the Bermudian courts  
The third argument made by the liquidators was as follows. PwC had not 
applied for a stay in terms of section 184 in the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal of Bermuda.58 The Board acknowledged this contention. 
Still, PwC had squarely raised the lack of jurisdiction to make the winding-
up order, and had argued that this lack of jurisdiction justified reversing the 
winding-up order on appeal. The outcome amounted to a permanent stay. 
The opportunity of obtaining an order under section 184 had been argued 
before the Board, and the liquidators had been allowed to discuss it. In the 
absence of unfairness to the liquidators, Her Majesty, exercising the powers 
of the court a quo, should stay the winding-up.59 
4.2.2.4 The refusal of a stay was justifiable on the facts  
The fourth argument made by the liquidators was as follows. On these facts 
there were "good reasons for not granting a stay".60 The Board disagreed 
with this contention. Often the court would be convinced that it was too late 
to stay the winding-up order even though jurisdiction was clearly lacking. 
The winding-up might have been so advanced that matters could not be 
restored or reorganised properly. Rights might also have been created or 
altered for third parties. As a result, it would be "unjust to stay the winding 
up (or more unjust to stay than not to stay)".61  
That, however, was not the position in the PwC case. No one had acted 
irrevocably under the winding-up order. The liquidators could only have 
acted against PwC or gained control of the Bermudian shares. What is 
significant is that the Board held that the 
… pursuit of PwC cannot possibly be invoked to justify a contention that it is 
now too late to stay the winding up.62 
                                            
57  See the comments in the Mid East case 747A-B. 
58  PwC case paras 29, 43. 
59  PwC case para 43. 
60  PwC case paras 29, 44. 
61  PwC case para 44. 
62  PwC case para 44. 
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4.2.2.5 The dispute about the stay should be remitted to Bermuda 
The fifth and final argument made by the liquidators was as follows. The 
dispute about the stay ought to have been remitted to the Supreme Court 
of Bermuda.63 Again, the Board disagreed with this contention. To recap: 
obviously, there had been no jurisdiction to grant the winding-up order. The 
court thus could stay the winding-up on these facts. There was "no good 
reason" not to do so.64 And if the winding-up were not stayed, this result 
would be "thoroughly unjust" to PwC, the sole direct target of the order, who 
were attacking the validity of the order for the first time.65 
The Board considered the position if section 184 had not applied to this 
matter.66 For the reasons given above, the Bermudian Court of Appeal 
would still have had jurisdiction to take the required steps, which were as 
follows. The court should have added PwC as parties to the winding-up 
proceedings; allowed their late appeal against the issue of the winding-up 
order; approved PwC's reasoning that the jurisdiction for the winding-up had 
been lacking; and set the winding-up order aside.67 PwC had made this 
argument in the Bermudian Court of Appeal. The Board reiterated that the 
technical outsider to the winding-up was not the company, the liquidator, the 
Official Receiver, a contributory or a creditor. The Board emphasised how 
rarely such an outsider could successfully apply to bring such an appeal, 
especially if time had run out, but the PwC case had several special 
features. The application related to jurisdiction, the liquidators had not acted 
irrevocably, and the applicants were the only targets of the winding-up and 
had not delayed in dealing with the problem.68 There was only one proper 
outcome: the court should allow PwC's application and set the winding-up 
order aside.69 The Board also terminated the section 195 order.70 
                                            
63  PwC case paras 29, 45. 
64  PwC case para 45. 
65  PwC case para 45. 
66  PwC case para 46. 
67  PwC case para 46. 
68  PwC case para 46. 
69  PwC case para 46. 
70  PwC case paras 24, 47. 
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4.2.3 PwC's argument in reserve 
The Board then discussed the argument that PwC would have raised if their 
preceding arguments had failed.71 This contention was that the section 195 
order had to be rescinded even if the winding-up survived.  
Usually, so the Board held, this argument would be dismissed if the third 
party could not convince the court to set that order aside,72 for the winding-
up order should be applied consistently. Yet, if this argument had been 
made in the PwC case, the Board "would have acceded to it",73 because the 
Supreme Court of Bermuda ought to have exercised its discretion and set 
aside the section 195 order. "This is only justifiable", held the Board, 
"because of the very limited purpose and effect of the winding up order 
made by the Supreme Court",74 the winding-up order having been granted 
so that the respondents could obtain the section 195 relief against PwC. 
The Board concluded that, if "it should not have been granted"75 and PwC 
were not allowed to attack the winding-up order, then a serious breach 
of PwC's rights and of natural justice would occur if PwC could not argue 
that 
… there had been no jurisdiction to make that order as a reason for denying 
the respondents the relief under section 195.76 
This result would have a restricted effect, as the "inability to pursue" the 
section 195 application would not prejudice the Bermudian winding-up. 
It might harm the Cayman winding-up, but that was not relevant to the 
PwC case. 
5 Comments 
The issues in the PwC case mainly concerned the lack of jurisdiction in this 
cross-border insolvency matter. Similarly, a difference in South African law 
is clear in the contrast between the facts of two cross-border cases that went 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal. In Ward v Smit: In re Gurr v Zambia 
Airways Corporation Ltd,77 the court of first instance, the Witwatersrand 
Local Division, had jurisdiction, for the corporation was an external company 
                                            
71  PwC case para 47. 
72  PwC case paras 25, 40. 
73  PwC case para 48. 
74  PwC case para 48. 
75  PwC case para 48. 
76  PwC case para 48. 
77  1998 3 SA 175 (SCA) 178A-C (hereafter the Ward case). 
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under the definition in section 1 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, and in 
terms of section 322 of that statute, it had also registered with the registrar 
of companies. Ward's case may be contrasted with Moolman v Builders & 
Developers (Pty) Ltd (in Provisional Liquidation): Jooste Intervening.78 
Moolman was decided under the apartheid system, when the homelands, 
such as the Transkei, were regarded as falling outside South Africa. In 
Moolman the company was registered in the Transkei and had no 
established place of business in South Africa, and so it did not meet the 
definition of an "external company" in section 1 of the 1973 Act. The South 
African courts thus did not have jurisdiction to wind it up under that statute. 
As a result, the Transkei liquidator could not apply the machinery of that Act, 
such as an examination by a commissioner under section 418, to carry out 
his duties. 
The Board in the PwC case found that the Supreme Court of Bermuda had 
no jurisdiction to wind up SICL under either of the Bermudian statutes 
considered. For the sake of comparison with South African law, a 
corresponding finding by a local court is considered. This finding would be 
that the relevant entity did not qualify as an external company under the 
Companies Act 1973, so the South African court would lack jurisdiction to 
wind up the company under that statute.  
What happens if, even though the court lacks jurisdiction under the 
Companies Act 1973 to grant a winding-up order against the auditors, the 
South African court does grant a winding-up order so that the liquidators 
may examine the auditors under section 417 of that Act? It is submitted that 
this winding-up order would be regarded as legally effective in South African 
law unless set aside by a subsequent court order.79 Usually, a final judgment 
                                            
78  1990 1 SA 954 (A) 959D-E. 
79  See Van Loggerenberg and Bertelsmann Erasmus: Superior Court Practice OS, 2015, 
D1-576 n8, citing cases such as Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 
2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) 242C-244A; Jacobs v Baumann 2009 5 SA 432 (SCA) 439G-
H; and Minister of Home Affairs v Somali Association of South Africa 2015 3 SA 545 
(SCA) 570F-H. Van Loggerenberg and Bertelsmann Erasmus: Superior Court 
Practice continues (OS, 2015, D1-576 n8): "A judgment given where the court has no 
jurisdiction is a nullity and does not require to be set aside. It could simply be ignored. 
However, in the event of the parties disagreeing as to the status of an impugned 
judgment, the court should be approached for a rescission of the judgment. See, in 
this regard, the notes to s 21 of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 s v 'Lack of 
jurisdiction' in Volume 1, Part A2". As to such a judgment's being a nullity, see cases 
such as S v Absalom 1989 3 SA 154 (A) 164E-G (hereafter the Absalom case); 
Vidavsky v Body Corporate Sunhill Villas 2005 5 SA 200 (SCA) 207C-F (hereafter the 
Vidavsky case); and Campbell v Botha 2009 1 SA 238 (SCA) 243I-244A (hereafter 
the Campbell case). For the principle that the judgment need not be set aside, see the 
Vidavsky case 207C and the Campbell case 244A. For the principle that the judgment 
may simply be ignored, see the Absalom case 164F and the Campbell case 244A. For 
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and/or order stands because the court that has issued the judgment or order 
has discharged its duties. It is functus officio.80 Further, a winding-up order 
continues unless an application is instituted that the court which granted the 
order should set it aside as irregular, or unless an appeal is brought so as 
to have the order set aside by an appeal court.81 The unusual facts in 
circumstances like those of the PwC case would be the lack of jurisdiction 
and the chief purpose to target outsiders, the debtor's previous auditors, 
under section 417 of the 1973 Act. (And the context, as in the PwC case, 
would be that the controllers of the company had removed property of the 
company to a foreign country. This country would be neither the country of 
the original winding-up nor South Africa.82) The applicant would have to 
furnish a copy of the winding-up application to specified persons.83 The list 
does not include the auditors,84 so the auditors would not be entitled to 
receive such a copy. Still, notice of the winding-up would be published in 
the Government Gazette.85 
The Board dealt with PwC's challenge by relying on section 184(1) of the 
Bermudian Companies Act. Its provisions are similar in some respects to 
those of section 354 of the Companies Act 1973 in South African law. The 
Board acknowledged the considerable authority that the auditors were not 
mentioned among the persons listed in section 184(1). The auditors do not 
seem to have obtained the consent of any of those listed persons to bring 
the application under section 184(1). It has been submitted that only a few 
persons have standing to apply under section 354 of the Companies Act 
                                            
present purposes, it is assumed that the parties disagree over the status of the 
impugned winding-up order. The liquidators are determined to pursue the auditors, 
and the auditors maintain that, in these circumstances, the South African court has no 
jurisdiction to grant the winding-up order because the company does not qualify as an 
external company under the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
80  West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 1926 AD 173- 176 178 186-
187 192; Estate Garlick v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1934 AD 499 502; 
Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro AG 1977 4 SA 298 (A) 306F-G; Cilliers, 
Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen 926 n89; Van Loggerenberg and 
Bertelsmann Erasmus: Superior Court Practice para D1-561 n1; Harms Civil 
Procedure para B42.2 n1. 
81  See Blackman et al Commentary RS 2, 2005 ch 14, 190 n1331 referring to the Mid 
East case and the Isaacs case. 
82  See the subsequent explanation by Chief Justice Smellie of the Cayman Islands in 
Smellie 2015 http://tinyurl.com/zh3d68z 24 n35. 
83  Section 346(4A) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
84  Blackman et al Commentary RS 8, 2011 ch 14, 172-174; Kunst, Delport and Vorster 
Henochsberg 724(3)-724(4). 
85  Section 356(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973; Blackman et al Commentary RS 3, 
2006 ch 14, 227-228; Kunst, Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 751-753. 
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1973 for the stay or setting aside of the winding-up order in South African 
law. These persons are 
… exclusively the liquidator of the company (including its provisional 
liquidator), a creditor or a member of the company.86  
The applicant's standing must also be proved.87 It is conceivable that, in the 
comparable situation under discussion, SICL owed the auditors unpaid 
debts. This fact would have made the auditors creditors of SICL. It would 
thus have provided them with the standing required by section 354 of the 
1973 Act. But the judgment of the Board in the PwC case does not express 
this idea. It cannot therefore form part of the reasoning in the comparable 
circumstances considered from a South African point of view. None the less, 
a significant feature of the judgment in the PwC case is the ruling by the 
Board regarding the liquidators. The liquidators should have raised the 
possible lack of jurisdiction. The auditors were not before the court. The 
liquidators could have applied to have the winding-up order stayed. 
Similarly, the liquidators could act in terms of the South African section 354, 
for they are listed in that section. 
Section 184(1) of the Bermudian 1981 Act contains a finite list. It mentions 
the persons who may apply to stay the winding-up. The Board still decided 
the case in terms of section 184(1). In doing so, the Board added further 
persons – the auditors – who could apply for the stay of the winding-up. 
These persons were not listed by the Parliament of Bermuda when it passed 
the Companies Act 1981.  
The liquidators brought cognate proceedings against PwC in Singularis 
Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda) (hereafter the 
Singularis case).88 In the Singularis case, the liquidators sought the 
recognition of their status as liquidators appointed by the Cayman court. 
They also sought the assistance of the Bermudian court at common law. 
Lord Collins was clear that legislating by courts should be only interstitial.89 
                                            
86  See Kunst, Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 747. 
87  Ex parte Strip Mining (Pty) Ltd: In re Natal Coal Exploration Co Ltd (in Liq) 1999 1 SA 
1086 (SCA) 1090A. 
88  2014 UKPC 36 (10 November 2014), 2015 2 WLR 971 (hereafter the Singularis case). 
89  See the Singularis case paras 65-69, referring to Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City 
Council 1999 2 AC 349 378 per Lord Goff of Chieveley; Southern Pacific Co v Jensen  
244 US 205 221 (1917) per Holmes J; Cardozo Nature of the Judicial Process 103, 
113; Posner How Judges Think 86; and Bingham Business of Judging 32. 
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Nor should statutes be applied "as if" they did apply when clearly they did 
not apply.90 Lord Collins concluded that such reasoning was 
… not only wrong in principle, but also profoundly contrary to the established 
relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.91 
It is therefore surprising to find that, although the facts of the PwC case were 
unusual, the Board added persons – the auditors – to the list in section 
184(1), for in doing so, the Board extended the scope of the section beyond 
that set by the Parliament of Bermuda. It is doubtful whether this activity 
could be described as interstitial legislating by the Board. The two appeals 
– in the PwC case and the Singularis case – were both heard by the Privy 
Council in April 2014 and judgment was given in November 2014. The 
Board criticised legislating from the bench in the Singularis appeal, yet it 
remains a puzzle that the warnings of the Board were not borne in mind by 
the same judges when they gave judgment in the PwC appeal. 
The Board in the PwC case held that the winding-up application under the 
Companies Act 1981 could have been challenged when it was heard in 
Bermuda. This would have been the best time for the auditors to oppose 
such an application because the court lacked jurisdiction to wind up the 
company.  
(By way of comparison, consider the requirements of section 354 of the 
Companies Act 1973 in South Africa. The applicant is arguing that the 
winding-up order should never have been granted. He is required to prove 
that there are special circumstances for setting aside the order. He also has 
to explain satisfactorily why the granting of the winding-up order was not 
opposed or appealed, or why the application for relief was delayed.92)  
It is assumed that the liquidators seeking the local winding-up order under 
the legislation on companies have not notified the auditors. The auditors 
should challenge the winding-up as soon as they can reasonably do so after 
seeing the advertisement of the proceedings. The liquidators would object 
to the jurisdiction of the South African court as a preliminary point of law.93 
This step by way of an exception would presuppose that the auditors or their 
legal advisers keep up to date with the contents of the Government Gazette 
                                            
90  Singularis case paras 78-83. 
91  Singularis case para 83. 
92  Kunst, Delport and Vorster Henochsberg 748, citing the Ward case 180; and see 
Aubrey M Cramer Ltd v Wells 1965 4 SA 304 (W) 305; Herbst v Hessels 1978 2 SA 
105 (T) 108-109 and cases there cited. Also see Blackman et al Commentary RS 8, 
2011 ch 14, 224-1-224-2 nn1571-1573. 
93  Compare Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen 93. 
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as relevant to them concerning a particular debtor whom they have audited, 
and that they are conscious of the possible implications, for them, of such a 
notice of a winding-up order. The significant feature of the present 
circumstances would be that the foreign liquidators' reason for bringing the 
local winding-up application would be to obtain the order to examine the 
auditors under relevant South African legislation. It was held in the PwC 
case that, in such narrow circumstances, it would be a breach of natural 
justice not to notify the auditors and allow them to make representations 
regarding the court order. This important reason – the foreign liquidators' 
pursuit of the previous auditors of the company – may not be clear from the 
notification of the winding-up proceedings in the Government Gazette. It is 
possible that this reason is not stated as the express purpose of the 
proceedings. Context still matters. The problem may be recapped. The 
auditors have been required by the courts of a foreign country to provide the 
liquidators with information and documents. The auditors have complied 
with that foreign court order tardily and incompletely in that country. The 
liquidators have therefore applied for a winding-up in the home jurisdiction 
(such as South Africa) of the relevant registered branch of the auditors. It is 
submitted that it is a fair inference by this branch that the foreign liquidators' 
chief purpose in bringing this application is to engage the machinery of the 
local legislation on companies. The liquidators are pursuing these auditors 
for information and documents with respect to the debtor whom they have 
audited. It is also submitted that if the ex parte application brought by the 
foreign liquidators for the winding up of the company in South Africa does 
claim relief against the auditors in the form of an order for their examination 
under section 417 of the Companies Act, then this application is required to 
be "addressed" to those auditors but it does not need to be served on 
them.94 And it is submitted that, as the auditors would be interested parties 
who would be prejudiced by this application for winding-up, they should be 
joined in this application.95 At this stage, it may be advisable for the auditors 
to seize the nettle. They should oppose the application on the point of law 
that the final winding-up order should not be granted because the court 
lacks jurisdiction under the Companies Act 1973 to wind up the company.96 
                                            
94  Compare Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen 421 n9. 
95  See Ex parte Body Corporate of Caroline Court 2001 4 SA 1230 (SCA), referred to by 
Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen 422; see also Rule 6(2) of the 
Uniform Rules of Court. 
96  Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen 456. 
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The liquidators as the applicants for the winding-up order would bear the 
burden of proving that the court had jurisdiction to hear their application.97 
In addition, the liquidators would have a duty of dealing fairly and 
disinterestedly with everyone interested in the liquidation.98 They would 
have a duty not to conceal or suppress knowledge that they had acquired 
during their investigation, which was material to ascertaining the true 
position. This duty would be owed to the court, among others. Further, it is 
submitted that, in South African law, counsel would owe a duty to bring to 
the attention of the court a feature – the existence or lack of jurisdiction – 
that might be adverse to their case and important to the decision of the 
case.99 If the clear lack of jurisdiction were to be dealt with at this early stage 
in terms of the duties resting upon the applicant foreign provisional 
liquidators and their legal representatives, then the local winding-up order 
would probably not be granted, because an essential element of the 
liquidators' application would be missing. It would follow that the order for 
the examination of the auditors under section 417 of the Companies Act 
1973 would probably not be granted either. 
It is submitted that if one accepts that the auditors may successfully 
challenge the issuing of the winding-up order, then the further reasoning of 
the Board as to the right of the auditors to challenge the consequent issuing 
of the section 195 order may form a useful ground of comparison for the 
auditors who seek to challenge the issuing of the corresponding order 
against them under section 417 of the South African Companies Act 1973, 
so the auditors would be directly affected by the winding-up order. They 
would not merely be friends of the court. It would be a breach of natural 
justice if the auditors were not heard by the court. The auditors could 
challenge the winding-up order during the liquidation proceedings 
themselves. No procedural principle would prevent them from doing so. The 
auditors should challenge the winding-up order as soon as is reasonably 
possible. They would not wish to be met with the reasoning by the liquidators 
or the court that it was too late to stay or set aside the winding-up order.100 
                                            
97  The founding affidavit attached to the notice of motion must, among other things, state 
facts that establish the jurisdiction of the court (Harms Civil Procedure para B6.23 n2, 
applying the law regarding summonses to applications, with reference to Kikillus v 
Susan 1955 2 SA 137 (W); Marais v Munro & Co Ltd 1957 4 SA 53 (EDL); Natalse 
Landboukoöp Bpk v Fick 1982 4 SA 287 (N). As Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and 
Van Winsen 438 point out with respect to the contents of the supporting affidavit, "If 
the court is not satisfied on the facts stated in the application that it has jurisdiction, it 
will not entertain the proceedings". 
98  See Cilliers and Luiz 1995 THRHR 606 regarding the English position. 
99  See Toto v Special Investigating Unit 2001 1 SA 673 (E) 683A-E; Ex parte The Master 
of the High Court South Africa (North Gauteng) 2011 5 SA 311 (GNP) para 43. 
100  See the text accompanying fn 61 above. 
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By acting promptly the auditors would not encounter the obstacle that the 
liquidators had acted irrevocably. 
A further line of reasoning is considered for the sake of argument. The 
following considerable assumptions are made: the South African court has 
decided that it has jurisdiction to hear the matter; the auditors are not in 
court; and a final winding-up order has been granted. It is submitted that the 
auditors in their capacity as auditors are not in the finite list of persons in the 
South African section 354, so the better view would be for the auditors in a 
situation like the one in the PwC case to proceed to have the winding-up 
order set aside on a basis other than that of section 354. Instead, the 
auditors in the present circumstances could apply to have the winding-up 
order set aside because of error concerning the existence of jurisdiction. 
The auditors would argue that the winding-up order was erroneously sought 
and erroneously granted in the absence of the auditors, who were the only 
targets of the winding-up and thus the parties affected by the winding-up 
order.101 A judgment may be rescinded because the court mistakenly 
believed that the defendant did know about the hearing although in fact this 
was not so.102 If the auditors did not, in fact, know about the hearing of the 
winding-up application, then that might be a ground for setting aside the 
winding-up order.  
The principle is that the court's discretion is usually exercised in favour of 
the applicant who, through no fault of his own, was not allowed to oppose 
the order granted against him and who, once he finds out about this order, 
acts quickly to have the state of affairs corrected.103 
To prove their standing, the auditors in circumstances like those in the PwC 
case would show that they were directly and substantially interested in the 
outcome of the winding-up application sufficiently to be entitled to have 
                                            
101  Rule 42(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court. 
102  See Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen 931-932 n125, citing De Sousa 
v Kerr 1978 3 SA 635 (W); Topol v L S Group Management Services (Pty) Ltd 1988 1 
SA 639 (W); Nyingwa v Moolman 1993 2 SA 508 (Tk) 510E-F (hereafter the Nyingwa 
case); also see Grantully (Pvt) Ltd v UDC Ltd 2000 JOL 6396 (ZS) 5; Weelson v 
Waterlinx Pool and Spa (Pty) Ltd 2013 JDR 0669 (GSJ) paras 5-6 (hereafter the 
Weelson case); and Moosa v Siddi-Akoo 2014 JDR 1674 (GP) para 5 (hereafter the 
Moosa case). 
103  See Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen 930 n114, citing Theron v 
United Democratic Front (Western Cape Region) 1984 2 SA 532 (C) 536; the Nyingwa 
case 510-511  512; Van der Merwe v Bonaero Park (Edms) Bpk 1998 1 SA 697 (T) 
703; also see Brits v Nedbank Ltd 2010 JDR 0495 (GNP) para 3; the Weelson case 
paras 5-6; and the Moosa case para 5. 
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opposed the original application for the winding-up order.104 The auditors 
would argue that their interest concerned a basic requirement of the matter 
– the court’s jurisdiction to hear the application for winding-up under the 
Companies Act 1973. This choice of approach to dealing with the matter 
would also help the auditors to bypass the further issue of whether they 
ought to have been cited as parties by the foreign liquidators. If the attempt 
by the auditors to have the winding-up order set aside were to be dismissed 
by the court, this step would afford them a ground for approaching the 
appeal court. The auditors would then argue that in these circumstances 
there had been a failure of natural justice by the court of first instance, which 
had failed to hear the other side before rendering a final decision on whether 
to grant the winding-up order. 
On a more abstract level, the combination of some of the relevant principles 
reveals a lurking danger. The order of a high court stands because the court 
is functus officio. The order is thus effective until it is examined and set aside 
by the high court itself or by the court of appeal. But a high court order that 
has been granted without the necessary jurisdiction may be ignored. Yet a 
party who applies for such an order to be set aside must show that there 
was no fault by that party and that, having found out that the order had been 
granted, that party acted promptly to have the position corrected. Often, too, 
the court may conclude that it is too late to stay the winding-up order even 
though jurisdiction was clearly lacking. The winding-up may be so far 
advanced that matters cannot be restored or reorganised properly. Rights 
may also have been created for third parties. Consequently, in the words of 
Lord Neuberger, it would be "unjust to stay the winding up (or more unjust 
to stay than not to stay)".105 If all these principles are read together, then it 
appears that the party who knows that the court does lack jurisdiction, or 
who considers that the court may possibly have lacked jurisdiction, but who 
chooses to ignore the resultant court order does so at his peril, for he may 
later find that the court decides that he is too late to stay the winding-up 
order. The court may hold that matters cannot be corrected and third parties' 
rights have been created or altered, so that staying the winding-up would 
be unfair. One inference is to be drawn. Once the targeted person suspects 
that the winding-up is flawed because the court lacked jurisdiction to grant 
it, he should promptly act. He should have the winding-up order stayed or 
set aside so that he cannot be blamed for leaving the position uncorrected.  
                                            
104  See Cilliers, Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen 944 n207, citing United Watch 
& Diamond Co (Pty) Ltd v Disa Hotels Ltd 1972 4 SA 409 (C) 415; Standard General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Gutman 1981 2 SA 426 (C) 433B-436D. 
105  PwC case para 44. 
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6 Conclusion 
The PwC case revealed a problem of cross-border insolvency law. The 
liquidators were frustrated at the slow, unsatisfactory furnishing of 
documents and information by the previous auditors in the Cayman Islands, 
so they obtained a winding-up order in Bermuda solely to have the auditors 
examined in their home jurisdiction. The auditors successfully appealed to 
the Privy Council. The court unanimously held that, in these particular 
circumstances, the auditors ought to have been added as parties to the 
winding-up. It had been a failure of natural justice by the court of first 
instance not to hear them. Both the winding-up order and the order for the 
examination of the auditors were stayed.  
This case comment regarding the PwC case described the reasoning of the 
Board in reaching its decision. It was submitted that the decision showed 
that the relevant statutory provisions entitled the liquidators but not the 
auditors to apply for the stay of the proceedings. The circumstances were 
unusual. The jurisdiction of the court was queried and the auditors were the 
only target of the winding-up application under the legislation on companies. 
Still, the Board added the auditors to the statutory list of persons who could 
apply for the stay of the proceedings. It was submitted that the Board thus 
legislated in a manner which it disapproved of in the Singularis case. It was 
submitted that instead the auditors could apply for the stay or setting aside 
of the winding-up order on the grounds of error as to the existence of 
jurisdiction to hear the winding-up application if such a dispute were to arise 
in South African law. In addition, it was explained that the auditors, although 
they would be outsiders to the winding-up, would still be able to take the 
initiative at an earlier stage. They should act promptly and argue a 
preliminary point of law. Jurisdiction would be lacking under the Companies 
Act 1973, and the auditors would be the direct target of the section 417 
order. By means of this argument, the liquidators could oppose the granting 
of the final winding-up order. 
The reasoning of the Board can be criticised for the unwarranted addition of 
the auditors to the relevant statutory list of those persons who may apply to 
have the winding-up order stayed. However, the reasoning may still be 
supported for the ruling that at an earlier stage the auditors, as a target of 
the winding-up application, should have been notified of the proceedings, 
that they had standing, and that they were entitled to oppose the making of 
the final order, because the court lacked jurisdiction under the legislation on 
companies. If this conclusion is accepted, then the entitlement of the 
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auditors as outsiders to challenge the winding-up is confirmed. The relevant 
principle of company law is thus expanded.  
The decision of the Board has implications for the theory and practice of 
company law. The Board did acknowledge the considerable authority that, 
in general, parties whose interests are affected by a winding-up do not have 
standing to oppose the granting of the winding-up application, yet on the 
narrow basis of the facts in the PwC case, such standing may be found to 
exist where jurisdiction is lacking and the challenger is the direct target of 
the intended winding-up. This decision by the Board is of persuasive 
authority in South African law. It will be interesting to see whether it will be 
referred to with approval by the courts in South Africa. 
This case comment has focused on the decision by the Board in the PwC 
case. The decision sets a new direction for the development of company 
law in England and Bermuda. It is possible that aspects of the reasoning by 
the Board may be adopted in the development of the corresponding law of 
South Africa. These advances should be welcomed. 
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